Война Судного Дня 73-74 года в воздухе
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SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытныйBefore a discussion of the Egyptian air activity can be closed, mention
must be made of the number of sorties flown and losses sustained. The
Egyptian Air Force flew about 6,900 sorties during the war, with about one-
half of these claimed to have been air support. However, this figure seems
high if the term air support is interpreted as ground attack. In the later
stages of the war, the Egyptian Air Force flew nearly 2,500 sorties of which
1,800 were fighter sorties and 300 were fighter bomber sorties. From this
ratio it can be seen that the large majority of missions were fighter sorties
so that the 3,400 sorties claimed as air support probably included the MIG-21
sorties flying as cover, and a more accurate figure of 1,000 actual ground
attack sorties can be projected. The Egyptians admitted losing only 50 air-
craft in their wartime communiques but later on President Sadat admitted the
loss of 120 planes. Department of Defense officials estimated the Egyptians
lost 182 while Israel claimed it downed 223 aircraft and 42 helicopters. The
Egyptian air defense forces claimed that their missiles and guns shot down
about two-thirds of the total Israeli losses.
SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытныйПричем, на асик.орг данные о 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF 10Oct73 F-4E Crashed^ MiG-17 SyAF
Вероятно, относятся к сбитому над Сирийским аэродромом Фантому или Фантомам, который упал(и) или был(и) сознательно направлен(ы) на МиГи-17.
SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный SergeVLazarev опытный VooDoo аксакалКоличество вылетов ВВС Израиля:
Admittedly, the question raised by the combatants concerning aircraft
losses and enemy aircraft destroyed may never be resolved. During wartime
communiques, Israel claimed to have destroyed 127 Egyptian and 100 Syrian
aircraft, while not losing a single one. Later post war figures from
different sources claimed that between 368 and 550 Arab aircraft were de-
stroyed with about 400 the most widely published figure.67 Whatever the
real figure, the Israelis maintained that most of these were destroyed in
air-to-air combat with only about 22 aircraft being destroyed on the
ground. Israeli losses, depending on the figures selected, ranged between
102 and 289.68 Generally, 103 aircraft and six helicopters were the most
widely published figures.
While these figures are certainly very interesting, the number of
sorties flown could be a topic for research itself. Estimates of Israeli
sorties for the war ranged from a low of 10,500 to a high of 18,000. A
figure of 12,000 would mean that the Israelis averaged about 650 to 700
sorties a day which is not an unreasonable amount considering the number
of aircraft.69 By considering the number of Mirage III and Super Mystere
aircraft available, the threat posed by Arab aircraft, and the home defense
policy, an estimate of the number of air defense sorties would range from
160 to 240 a day or between 25% to 37% of available sorties. This would
leave between 400 to 500 sorties for close air support and interdiction.
Most Arab sources generally credit the Israelis with a larger number of
total sorties with about 20,000 a projected figure. This would be a tre-
mendous output of sorties and cast doubt on the real number of Israeli
aircraft available or the maintenance and pilot fatigue factors. In any
air conflict the difficulty in accurately reporting both sorties and
especially losses remains. In this conflict, the accuracy was hampered
further by multiple radar and visual observations of the same event, secrecy
of the combatants, and intense political and military motivations to portray
events in the best possible light. Accuracy of figures, while important, is
clearly secondary as far as what implications can be garnered for the Marine
VooDoo аксакалAir Operations During The 1973 Arab-Israeli War And The Implications For Marine
Air Operations During The 1973 Arab-Israeli War And The Implications For Marine Aviation CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA Aviation WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Air Operations During the 1973 Arab-Israeli …
SergeVLazarev опытныйКстати, очень рекомендую почитать статью Сухова. Весьма показательно, что потери ВВС Сирии идеально укладываются в базу данных Асик.орг
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Замечу, что имеется как минимум один случай, когда израильтяне <наболтали лишнего> о своих потерях в войне 1973 г. K.В.Сухов в своих мемуарах <Над Сирийским фронтом> приводит слова премьер министра Израиля Голды Меир: <за 22 дня боевых действий только ВВС лишились 65% списочного состава летчиков> (см. <Авиация и Время> №1/95 с. 17). При этом везде (не только у К.В.Сухова) указывается, что израильтяне имели на каждый самолет 1,5 - 2 подготовленных экипажа>. Если сопоставить эти цифры со словами Г.Меир, получается, что ВВС Израиля в ходе войны 1973 г. потеряли не только все имеющиеся на момент начала войны <фантомы> и <Скайхоки>, но и большую часть полученных уже в ходе войны самолётов этих типов. Замечу, что <Миражи> и <Нешеры> в 1973 г., как правило, для ударных функций не применялись и поэтому их относительные потери, в сравнении с теми, что выпали на долю американских машин, оказались сравнительно невелики, хотя всё равно весьма тяжёлыми.
Кстати, у меня возникли сходные чувства.
Во первых, Я НИГДЕ НЕ НАШЕЛ данных по составу ИАФ к концу войны 1973 года. Во вторых, нигде не нашел списка потерь ИАФ.
В третьих, ужасно много дикой и лапшистой пропаганды.
SergeVLazarev опытныйтам же, ильин. И после этого евреи, имеют наглость утверждать, что они потеряли только 31 летчика убитым и 14 пленными, при потере 33 <Фантомов>, 53 <Скайхоков>, 11 <Миражей>/>Нешеров>, шести <Супер Мистеров> и такого же количества вертолетов (<История ВВС Израиля. Крылья возмездия> с.235 - 236)? Уместно задать вопрос: они нас там на своей <земле обетованной> за придурков считают или кретинов? При этом арабы, по подсчётам иудеев, якобы потеряли: Египет - 225 самолетов и 43 вертолета, Сирия - 121 самолет и 13 вертолетов, Ирак - 21 самолет, Алжир/Ливия - около 60 самолетов (там же).
VooDoo аксакалСтранная статья. С одной стороны про непонятки с потерями сказано совершенно верно, но с конспирологией автор явно перегнул палку.
"Замечу, что евреи нигде и никогда(!!) не приводят номера своих эскадрилий, указывая только их англоязычное название. Напомню также, что израильтяне по сей день во время публичных показов своей авиатехники закрашивают или заклеивают эмблемы своих эскадрилий, а иногда и бортовые номера."
Например вот тут есть и номера и неанглоязычные названия, и эмблемы и номера:
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SergeVLazarev опытныйПо бою ЯКОБЫ 30 апреля, когда сбили наших 5 самбалей:
On thurday, April 30th, a pair of F-4 Phantoms attacked an Egyptian radar station on the west bank of the Canal, escorted by 4 Mirage IIIs. No Russian response was sighted and the 4 Mirages begun penetrating deeper into Egypt. 12 minutes after the intial penetration 8 Russian Mig-21s were scrambled against the IAF fighters and first contact was made at 14:20. Coming from the east, the Mirages lured the Migs westward towards Cairo, when another quartet of Israeli Mirages appeared behind the Russians. With the confrontation clearly about to take place, every available Russian fighter was launched againt the Mirages and within seconds another 12 Migs were in the air. The air battle began with 8 Mirages facing 20 Mig-21s, but soon 4 Israeli Phantoms which had entered the area below radar coverage appeared from below and joined in the fight. Led by Avihu-Ben-Nun, Israel's first Phantom squadron commander (and IAF chief of staff during the Gulf War of 1991), the new addition to the battle caused the Russians to launch yet another 4 Migs into the air, bringing the total number of aircraft participating in the dog fight to 36 aircraft. The first Russian loss was shot down by the lead of the first Mirage III quartet, soon followed by an AIM-7 Sparrow kill from Avihu-Ben-Nun's aircraft, and a cannon kill by another Mirage III. After a fourth Mig was shot down by an F-4, the Russian pilots began breaking off. The Israeli fighters started giving chase but were ordered to return to Israel, with a desire by the IAF high command not to see any aircraft loss on the part of the IAF. Details of the dogfight were kept a secret, even from the aircraft ground crews which painted the Egyptian air force emblem as kill markings on the aircraft. Only after the story was published two months later in the British "Daily Express" were these markings changed to the Soviet air force's Red Star. The story revealed that besides the 4 known kills, another damaged aircraft had crashed approaching its air base, bringing the final result to 5:0 in favour of the IAF. Three Russian pilots parachuted to safety and two were killed. The source of the media report was apparently Egyptian, spurred by Russian arrogance and claims of Egyptian incompetence in earlier dealings with the Israeli Air Force.